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The possibility of using neuroimaging techniques to identify the neural
correlates of moral judgment by means of is, undoubtedly, one of the most important
developments in the history of normative social sciences. As neuroscience gradually
affords a more sophisticated knowledge of the brain, the possible moral, legal and social
implications of the knowledge about out cognitive ontogenetic program are beginning to
be considered under a more empirical perspective and in a way which is more respectful
with scientific methods.
Specifically in relation to the law, it seems possible to conjecture that
neuroscientific research on moral and legal cognition can eventually affect our
understanding of the nature of human thought and behavior, with profound
consequences for the domain of the legal phenomenons, from ontological and
methodological perspectives. There is no human institution as fundamental as juridical
norms, and no other field of scientific inquiry as stimulating as the study of the brain.
The combination of those elements, norm and brain, represents a naturally fascinating
and stimulating link, given that juridical norms and the behaviors they regulate are both
products of mental processes. In this particular context, the process of juridical
interpretation and application seems to be the adequate mechanism, the only possible
means, and the instrument with the necessary and sufficient capacity to bring the natural
combination of brain and norm to light.
Neither principles nor rules themselves regulate their application in the field of
human behavior. They only represent the passive foundations of the juridical system. In
order to reach a comprehensive model, an active pillar must be added to the passive
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2ones. This involves a procedure of interpretation, justification and application of
juridical rules and principles. Hence, the levels of rules, principles and human behavior
must be complemented by a third one: a process of specific realization of the law and
the corresponding, and inescapable, subjective-individual dimension of the jurist-
interpreter, this is, the neural level. In other words, with Gadamer or Dworkin, because
law is interpretation, there is no other law than applied law.
So, the idea, as we are seeing here these days, is to discuss the issues related
with the impact that cognitive neuroscience can have on the current methodological and
theoretical edifice of juridical science. If the ultimate cause of individualization of the
juridical reasoning or response does not lie from the legal system, though it must be
compatible with it, it seems obvious that it must lie in the juridical operator’s personal
convictions. That is to say, the subjectivity present in all act of juridical comprehension,
interpretation and application must be approached by means of the analysis of the neural
correlates of the juridical operator. Paraphrasing Philip Tobias’ (1997) observation
regarding the faculty of language, we judge with the brain.
In fact, there is every reason to believe that decision-making arises from
electrochemical activity of the brain’s neural networks. The experience of deciding is
not a fiction, but a consequence of physiological activity of a brain (the product of
cognitive and emotional systems in the brain) genetically molded throughout the
evolutionary history of our species and designed to think in a certain fashion. It is a
neural process, with the obvious function of selecting the “best solution” in light of
foreseeable consequences and their grounding.
It so happens that all hermeneutic constructions, such as the unity of the law’s
realization elaborated by contemporary theories, are currently based on the dominant
explanatory model of rational choice theory, building an ideal image of the jurists’
rationality and emotions in the process of decision-making. Its fundamental concept is
that, above all, judges are essentially rational and objective in their assessment of the
justice of the decision: they examine all factors related with the case to the best of their
ability and weigh the probable result of each of the possible options. The preferred
choice, the just one, is the one which fits better with the criteria of rationality and
objectivity by which it was generated.
The process of analyses we just described implies, essentially, an incompatible
operation with the knowledge afforded by neuroscience. It shapes a rational image, the
3decision of the judges, of something which seems to be, in itself, an activity which
involves certain irrational aspects.
The inadequacy of this image is brought to light with the analysis of how the brain
works during moral decision-making about what is just and unjust. Owing to the brain
processes that have been associated with this cognitive operation, it is necessary to
accept the undeniable presence of non-logical elements and, in general, of the intrusion
of values in juridical reasoning. In light of this, it is not acceptable nor legitimate to
carry on considering the hermeneutic task as an operation or set of operations
exclusively directed by deductive or cognitive syllogism. In fact, the human mind seems
to incorporate certain design defects that blur our biological legacy in regard to full
cognitive rationality and objectivity.
Thus the ethical juridical judgment, based not only on reasoning but also on
emotions and moral sentiments, carried out by brain mechanisms cannot be considered
as totally independent from the constitution and functioning of this organ that, in a first
analyses, seems not to have a single and nucleus for moral cognition. The best
neuroscientific model of normative judgment in the law and justice available today
seems to suggest that juridical reasoning implies a wide recruiting and use of different
systems of mental skills, related both to rational and emotional thought, and various
information sources, as Goodenough and Prehn (2005) suggested. It is the coordinated
and integrated activity of various brain structures that makes human moral behavior
possible. Moral judgment requires the interaction of frontal regions of the brain and
other centers, in a process involving emotion and intuition as fundamental components.
On the other hand, the activity of each of these brain regions is observed in a wide
diversity of cognitive operations, some related with social intelligence and others not, as
shown by the studies carried out by Greene (Greene et alii 2001; 2002) and Moll (Moll
et alii, 2002; 2003).
However, the identification of the cerebral basis that dictate the sense of justice
still raises relevant doubts, both in relation to its ontological and methodological
aspects. Can neuroscientific models of normative judgment in law and justice offer
powerful tools to identify falsities underlying common conceptions about human
psychology and rationality? To what point is it possible to find out where cognition
ends and emotion begins in the process of the realization of law? How far can this
neuroscientific perspective influence the current theoretical and methodological edifice
of juridical science? Or while we’re at it, how will our conception of man as cause and
4purpose of law change?, and consequently, will the jurist-interpreter’s task of the of
giving “hermeneutic life” to positive law be altered?
These questions have inspired a research project we have began to develop at the
Laboratory of Human Systematics, at the University of the Balearic Islands. Our
objective is to identify brain areas active during judgment tasks in magistrate
professionals and control participants by means of MEG and fMRI.
The project aims to identify the brain regions that are associated with the
performance of certain types of judgment. Specifically, our objective is to study brain
activity associated with judgments of a juridical nature and contrasting them with those
of a purely moral nature, without juridical consideration. Additionally, we intend to
compare the brain activity of magistrate professionals and people unrelated with this
profession when performing these judgments. The following questions will be
addressed: (I) whether “easy” and “difficult” (“hard cases”) judgments involve the same
brain processes; (II) whether brain activity in magistrate professionals is the same or
similar to that of other citizens; and (III) whether the activation of those brain circuits
coincides during ethical juridical, moral judgments and judgments without juridical
weight.
The recording of brain activity associated with these judgments will be carried
out by means of magnetoencephalography (MEG) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), with the objective of accurately establishing temporal and spatial
patterns. The project is related with two other ones. The first, carried out from the year
2000 to 2003, investigated the evolutionary dimension of language, as well as moral and
aesthetic judgments. The second, initiated in 2003, was aimed at analyzing brain
activity during aesthetic judgments with a great temporal resoluton (Cela-Conde et al.,
2004). In the present project, the study of the activation of brain circuits during moral
judgment tasks will be undertaken. A special emphasis will be placed on ethical
juridical judgments and on the professional experience of magistrates as a possible
source of differences.
The central idea is that the proposed experiments will allow, in the first place, to
ascertain which brain regions participate in judgment processes, both juridical and
purely moral judgments, both in the easy and difficult cases, all this in participants
without clinically diagnosed disturbances. We are not only interested in the spatial
localization of brain activity, we are also interested in its temporal distribution, which is
enormously important when understanding cognitive functions, as Barteks and Zeki
5(2004) pointed out. Additionally, we aim to understand to what extent do magistrate
professionals use the same cognitive judgment processes as the citizens without judicial
responsibilities.
It also permits the definition of whether in the act of judging (specially in the
called ones “hard cases”) the answers to the dilemmas by the different subjects
participating in the experiment vary substantially, most particularly regarding the
activities undertaken by magistrates belonging to a Tribunal (in 2º jurisdiction ) and by
judges who exercise the jurisdictional activity in the first degree of jurisdiction (in the
first instance). In this sense, it seems reasonable to assume that, in the first case (judges
belonging to the Tribunal), the neural correlates of active judging are the same as those
found in the trolley type dilemma, which involves a greater personal distance for who
is judging the action. The magistrates, who stand far from the parties and the concrete
facts, intervene in a non-arbitrary and impersonal way in the life plans of the individuals
involved in the lawsuit.
On the other hand, in the case of judges of first instance, the neural correlates of
the act of judging may be similar to those found in the footbridge type dilemma, which
involves a greater personal proximity with the juxtaposed interests,. Given that they are
in direct contact with the parties and concrete facts, the non-arbitrary form of
intervention implies a personal judgment in the act of intervening in the life plans of the
individuals involved in the lawsuit. However, it is obvious that the final result of both
cases is the same: applying the law to a specific case, intervening in an institutional and
non-arbitrarily form in the life plans of the people involved in a certain conflict of
interests.
Finally, this research project will allow us to identify the role that rationality
and emotion play in the act of judging and, thereafter, to design a methodological model
which is more suitable for the task of interpretation and application of positive law.
It is obvious that research in cognitive neuroscience of moral judgment, and a
very especially, of normative judgment in Law and Justice, may provide an enormous
and rich contribution to the detailed understanding of the internal functioning of the
human brain in the act of judging –of carrying out moral judgments about the just and
the unjust. Neuroscience may provide the necessary evidence about the nature of brain
activity and the brain stimuli involved in the decision process, on the degree of personal
involvement of the judges and the cultural conditioning in each specific case, and also
6on the limits of rationality and the degree of influence of the emotions and the human
sentiments in the formulation and conception about the “best decision”.
It is because neuroscience can prove the involvement of imperfect emotions and
irrational elements that we actually experiment in the task of judging, that it can make
such a profound contribution to the design and elaboration of “just decisions”. This
contribution should become more relevant than the illusion about rationality and ideal
emotions that we would like judges to have in the process of making the correct
decision.
Without forgetting of course, other distinctive aspects of the nature of human
behavior at the time of deciding on the sense of concrete justice and the existence of a
moral universe determined by the biological nature of our cognitive (neuronal)
architecture. After all, it is the brain that allows us to have a moral sense, that gives us
the necessary skills to live in society, to make decisions and solve certain social
conflicts, and that serves as a base for the most sophisticated philosophical discussions
and reflections on rights, duties, injustice and morality.
